Creaking noises from the GNU
29 September 2025 — What does the radio silence between GNU party leaders and President Ramaphosa portend? How confident are South Africa’s consumers? Have SA’s ports managed to become more globally competitive? What are the OECD’s economic growth expectations for 2026? What happens after AGOA expires on Tuesday?
Welcome to the weekly Risk Alert from the Centre for Risk Analysis — 29 September 2025
News reports on the weekend suggest that President Cyril Ramaphosa is avoiding the leaders of other parties in the Government of National Unity (GNU). Their last meeting was 144 days ago and attempts by other party leaders to arrange meetings have proved fruitless.
John Steenhuisen, leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the largest coalition partner of the African National Congress (ANC), has been unsuccessful at seeking a meeting with Mr Ramaphosa to discuss a replacement for Andrew Whitfield, the deputy trade and industry minister who was dismissed by Mr Ramaphosa in June. Corné Mulder, leader of the Freedom Front Plus (FF+), has been seeking to brief Mr Ramaphosa about his Washington meetings since July, also without success.
Gayton McKenzie, leader of the Patriotic Alliance, is threatening to leave the GNU and resign as sports minister on Tuesday if the ANC does not reappoint his party colleague, Kenny Kunene, to his mayoral committee role in Johannesburg. Mr Kunene was found at the house of Katiso Molefe, who has been linked to the murder of a popular musician, when the police came to arrest Mr Molefe in July. A legal probe has since cleared Mr Kunene of any wrongdoing.
The impression is that the rapidly weakening ANC is neglecting the GNU, a coalition constellation which the party did not wholly support. A possible outcome is that the nine non-ANC parties will pursue greater cooperation among themselves without the ANC. This would signal a sidelining of the ANC, despite its 40% vote share in the 2024 elections and its leading role in the government.
Within cabinet, Mr Mulder points out that ministers from different parties are operating independently and with minimal coordination despite regular cabinet meetings. This is a scenario described as the “Dunkirk flotilla” in the CRA’s 2025 scenario set.
The implication is that government performance will become more uneven as coordination declines, offering high performers a chance to shine brightly compared to their duller cabinet colleagues. It points towards further ANC weakening as well as a weaker position for Mr Ramaphosa within the party he leads. These developments suggest that the GNU might not survive the 2026 local government election stress test intact.
Consumer confidence in the doldrums
South Africa’s consumer confidence remains deeply negative and continues to deteriorate. The FNB/BER Consumer Confidence Index fell from -10 in Q2 to -13 in Q3, well below its long-term average of around -1. The last time the measure was positive was in Q2 2019.
Earlier in the year, the reading plunged to -20 in Q1, before recovering modestly. The deterioration in Q3 was led by middle-income households, where confidence collapsed from -7 to -16, with weaker sentiment in both the economic outlook and household finances sub-components.
In global comparison, South Africa ranks among the most pessimistic major economies. According to Ipsos, South Africa sits 25th out of 30 countries surveyed for consumer confidence. In the broader dataset presented by Trading Economics, South Africa’s -13 reading is far lower than more optimistic peers. For instance, consumer confidence in developed markets often remains in positive territory, and among emerging markets, South Africa’s sentiment is among the weakest.
From a growth-risk perspective, this weak confidence points to pronounced downside pressures on household consumption, which accounts for over 60% of GDP. The decline suggests consumption growth in the second half of the year may fall well below the 2.8% pace seen in Q2 and points to a risk that full-year consumption growth may underdeliver current forecasts.
If consumer demand slumps, it will compound constraints on investment, job creation, and tax revenue growth, increasing the probability that GDP growth in 2025 underperforms the 1% consensus estimate.
SA ports remain laggards
South Africa’s ports continue to occupy the bottom rungs of the Container Port Performance Index (CPPI). The 2024 edition ranked Durban dead last at 403rd of 403 total ports. Coega was ranked 402nd, Cape Town 400th, and Port Elizabeth 395th. Wait times and offloading were cited as the two major causes behind the ports’ continued underperformance.
Despite still being ranked very low, Cape Town showed the strongest year-on-year improvement, gaining 237.9 index points. The acquisition of new equipment improved the port’s performance through 2025 to date. Coega improved by 160.4 index points, the 4th strongest improvement overall.
Should those improvements continue into 2026, they will reflect in the next edition of the CPPI, which will use 2024/25 data. Per the CPPI: “Based on the latest data provided by Transnet, between mid-2024 and August 2025, vessel anchorage in South African ports went down by about 75%, gross crane moves per hour improved by 13%, and ship working moves went up by 25%”.
The CPPI draws attention to persistent challenges in the southern African region, including limited automation and weak connections to inland commercial and industrial hubs. Ports in this region also faced higher-than-usual traffic volumes in 2024 because of the Red Sea crisis, with rerouted ships adding to workloads.
If South Africa is to attain consistently higher growth rates, it must end the Transnet monopoly in policy as well as in practice. More than 80% of global trade by volume is moved via maritime transport, so improving performance in this area is critical for weathering future global trade upheaval as well as for taking advantage of opportunities.
Global growth warning
In its latest global growth forecast released last week, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) expects global growth to slow next year, down from an expected 3.2% in 2025 to 2.9% in 2026. It expects United States (US) growth to slow from 1.8% to 1.5% under the impact of higher import tariffs and elevated uncertainty, while the Euro area is expected to slow from 1.2% to 1.0%. For South Africa, the OECD projects 1.1% growth in 2025 (a downward revision of its June projection by 0.2 percentage points) and a slight improvement to 1.3% in 2026 (revised down by 0.1 points).
Against this global backdrop, South Africa’s weak trade infrastructure places it in a vulnerable position at a time of increased geopolitical volatility. The CPPI highlights the importance of efficient port operations for logistics costs and supply chains, based on which ports can act as “resilient catalysts for development.” Absent reliable, well-performing ports, South Africa’s dreams of above 3% growth will remain elusive.
National Treasury’s projected total expenditure for the 2025/26 financial year is R2.58 trillion. Of that, 48% is allocated to wages and interest payments. Should global growth slow in 2026 — especially in China, the US and Europe, key South African export markets — the country’s weak fiscal position will further depress government spending, infrastructure maintenance, and overall domestic growth.
There goes AGOA
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), offering sub-Saharan African countries duty-free access to the US market for over 1,800 products since 2000, expires on 30 September 2025. It ends amid a 30% reciprocal tariff on South African exports imposed by US President Donald Trump in his April 2025 “Liberation Day” executive order. The reciprocal tariffs diminish AGOA’s benefits without eliminating them entirely.
Reciprocal tariffs imposed by the US are applied in addition to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs that the US levies on imports from all World Trade Organisation members. Under AGOA, eligible products exported to the US entered duty free, overriding MFN tariffs.
The reciprocal tariffs raised duties on those goods from 0% to 30%, but AGOA still shielded them from MFN charges. With AGOA’s expiration, those products are now exposed to both the 30% tariff and MFN duties, sharply increasing costs for South African exporters to the US.
South African exporters reliant on AGOA preferences face strained margins, potential restructuring, and further job losses. US buyers may shift to other countries, as South Africa’s tariff burden exceeds most countries’ rates, which average 10%-15% in the region.
Pretoria’s trade delegation in the US must now secure a deal to ease market access. However, no bilateral deal can replicate AGOA’s 25-year trade benefits free from Mr Trump’s reciprocal tariffs. Although Mr Ramaphosa last week called for AGOA to be renewed at a meeting in New York, this call is unlikely to be heeded. South African exporters and US importers alike face a new trade reality in which competitiveness depends on rapid adaptation.
